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We study the location of various film-related services (such as camera rental, casting agencies 
or pyrotechnic services), the main determinant of interest being the human capital specificity. 
We show that firms which supply services with a lower firm specificity locate farther away 
from one another, and argue that it can be concluded that the "poaching" argument (fear of 
employees leaving for a competitor in large regional labour markets) has greater practical 
weight than the Marshallian labour pooling mechanism 
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The New Economic Geography has emphasised three major forces behind regional sectoral 
agglomeration: pecuniary externalities, such as local availability of suppliers for specific 
intermediate goods, technological externalities such as knowledge spillovers or common use 
of infrastructure, and labour pooling - i.e. an attractive reservoir of potential employees. 
However, just as technological externalities might become negative if too many firms locate 
too close to one another, the labour market might also provide disincentives for agglomeration 
due to poaching. A Chamber of Commerce manager of a prosperous town is quoted as saying: 
"We've got some companies asking us to stop recruiting companies", as more firms moving 
into the town from outside the region would increase competition for workers (Wirtz, 2002).  
Hence there is a trade-off between pooling and poaching. How does this trade-off react to a 
changing labour market environment - or more specifically, to a changing worker mobility? It 
has recently been argued by labour economists that human capital specificity is decreasing 
(e.g., Lindbeck and Snower, 2000). One reason might be the increased flexibility of computer 
technologies which can be used across different firms and industries - hence new employees 
are very soon familiar with the environment at their new workplace. While it is clear that this 
should result in a higher worker mobility between firms, the question remains: what are the 
possible effects on firms' location decisions and on the spatial organisation of industries?
1 
Would these labour market changes drive agglomeration or disagglomeration? In this paper 
we argue that this is not at all clear ex ante, and we provide a first empirical investigation. 
Section 2 sets out the main hypotheses. For an empirical investigation of these, we use data 
from our own survey of firms providing film related services, which are highly suited to our 
purpose for the reasons described at the beginning of section 3. Section 3.3 and 3.4 present the 
main results, section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                           
1 The literature I know of only investigates very different consequences of a changing human capital specificity, 
notably internal work organisation (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000), centralised wage bargaining (Lindbeck and 
Snower, 2001) and wage inequality (Aghion, Howitt and Violante, 2002).   3
2. Hypotheses on the interaction of the labour market and location 
Firms belonging to the same industry often cluster in certain regions, for a number of reasons 
usually discussed in regional economics as " localisation economies". One of the most 
prominent of these is the "labour market pooling" argument: it makes sense for firms to locate 
where vacancies can be filled by experienced workers who do not have to move when they 
take a new job. The way Alfred Marshall makes this point is often quoted, but it is worth 
repeating here: 
"Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to find a good choice of 
workers with the special skill which they require; while men seeking employment naturally go 
to places where there are many employers who need such skill as theirs and where therefore it 
is likely to find a good market."
2 
This way of thinking about labour markets in agglomerations also leads to: 
Hypothesis 1: The turnover rate is higher in (sectoral) agglomerations.  
Note that the matter of causality is not clear here: some firms might have a high "natural" 
turnover rate, as they work more than others on a project-by-project basis, creating temporary 
"adhocraties" (Mintzberg, 1979, ch.21; Benhamou, 2000, p.313). Needing to hire their staff 
accordingly, they should want to locate in agglomerations. On the other hand, firms in 
agglomerations might experience a high turnover rate, as their employees change from one 
employer to another more easily. In any case, finding no support for hypothesis 1 would cast 
some doubt on the labour pooling argument.  
Whether they have to move or not is not the only determinant of the employees' inclination to 
change their position. How easily they can do that also depends on the specificity of their 
human capital, i.e. how much of their productive knowledge and abilities is lost when they 
move from one firm to another (even within the same industry).  
Note that the amount and the specificity of human capital do not correlate perfectly. For 
example, new blue-collar workers with low education might need to receive intensive 
firm-specific training. On the other hand, human capital may be high but easily transferable if 
firms tailor their products and services individually for their customers, with a production-
specific routine being unlikely to play a major role. Nevertheless, the amount of human 
capital is still used as a proxy variable for its specifity in some empirical investigations (e.g., 
                                                           
2 Marshall (1890), Book IV Chapter X, quoted from the online edition at 
http://www.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/marshall/prin/prinbk4.   4
Alecke, Alsleben, Scharr and Untiedt, 2003); this is just a last resort, which should be used 
only if, in contrast to our investigation, no better data are available. 
One of the reasons why human capital specificity is important for location decisions is the 
following: "Since knowledge is partly embodied in workers, flows of workers can be 
associated with flows of knowledge so that poaching workers is a way for firms to raise their 
productivity." (Combes and Duranton, 2001, p.2) 
The term "poaching" is coined to indicate that this is a real concern for firms. It would be less 
of a problem if they could simply fill the position with new employees who have to pay for 
the firm specific training themselves (or accept appropriately reduced wages as long as their 
productivity is lower than that of their incumbent colleagues). However, Margaret Stevens has 
convincingly shown that firms with some labour market power, who pay a wage below the 
worker's marginal product, do have an incentive to increase their workers' productivity 
through providing training of skills, even if they are transferable
3.  
Hence a high tunrover rate might be undesirable, and locating where not many other firms of 
the same industry are waiting to poach workers might be a reasonable counter-strategy. 
Obviously the "labour pooling" argument and the "poaching" argument, plausible as both may 
be, work in opposite directions. When trying to assess empirically which argument is 
stronger, or more relevant, we make use of the fact that both work only if human capital is not 
completely firm-specific. Figure 1 illustrates this point. Starting with the lower row, presume 
for the moment that workers would lose their human capital completely if they moved from 
one firm to another. Then a labour market pool is not something which would make a location 
more attractive, and poaching would not be an issue. Whether generally the pooling 
mechanism is decisive or whether the poaching argument dominates, in this industry "B" the 
location of firms (represented by the dots in Figure 1) would be completely determined by 
some other factors.  
 
                                                           
3 However, the amount of general training will be suboptimal from a social point of view, due to the positive 
(poaching) externalities they generate (Stevens, 1996). Other possible reasons why firms pay for general training 
are discussed in Betcherman, Leckie and McMullen (1998), p.4, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), Autor (2001) 
and Cappelli (2002).   5
 
 
Now think of industry A as being very similar to industry B, with the only difference being 
that workers can easily (i.e. without losing any of their human capital or productivity) change 
from one firm to another. Furthermore, presume for the moment that only the labour market 
pooling argument is relevant. Then all firms should locate closely together, as illustrated in 
the upper left cell in Figure 1. On the other hand, if only the poaching argument were relevant 
for the firms, they would move to locations where they are regional labour market 
monopsonists (upper right corner of Figure 1). 
Of course, the first row in Figure 1 illustrates extreme polar cases, but comparing it to the 
second row demonstrates the following point: the specificity of human capital has an impact 
on firms' location decisions. Generalizing a bit, we now allow for a worker's human capital to 
be partly specific. Then the arguments discussed so far take the form of the following two 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2a: Comparing industries with different levels of human capital specificity, those 
with higher human capital specificity tend to be less concentrated in space, ceteris paribus.  
If we find support for hypothesis 2a, this could be interpreted as support for the Marshallian 
labour market pooling theory. If the poaching argument dominates, however, we should find 
support for the following   6
Hypothesis 2b: Comparing industries with different levels of human capital specificity, those 
with higher human capital specificity tend to be more concentrated in space, ceteris paribus.  
It is impossible to decide between hypotheses 2a and 2b without empirical work. A first step 
in this direction is taken with the study presented in the next section. 
 
3. An Empirical Assessment 
3.1. Background: The motion pictures industry 
A highly disaggregated industry structure, sometime referred to as "flexible specialization" 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984), is important for very differentiated goods or project-by-project 
services, as it allows a flexible choice of input suppliers who use more or less flexible 
general-purpose technologies. Film production is a prime example; it served as a case study 
for flexible specialization in Scott (1984), Storper (1989) and Storper and Scott (1990), for 
example. The main reason for the attention which has been paid to the movie industry in this 
stream of literature is probably that it is an extreme case, allowing the study in a rather pure 
form of what is expected still to come in other industries. Our reason for studying film 
production is simply this: It is extremely disaggregated in the sense that many different 
services needed for film production are carried out in separate firms, and for each of these 
services, local concentration can be observed. It would be much more difficult to isolate the 
impact of human capital specificity in a study on a wide range of industries with very 
different technologies and needs with respect to location. 
However, the German movie industry would not be very suitable for our purposes if its local 
sectoral concentration were as extreme as it is in Hollywood. Fortunately (for us, not for the 
German film producers), there is not one German centre for film production, but four: Berlin, 
Cologne, Hamburg and Munich. And only about 60 percent of the industry is actually located 
in these four "centres".. Thus, we observe firms, or services, which tend to agglomerate, and 
firms which do not.  
 
3.2. Empirical Strategy and Data  
The motivation for our study and the related thought experiments in sections 1 and 2 above 
refer to the effects of changes (in the labour market) over time. However, we are using a 
cross-sectional data set. The underlying idea is this: rather than observing one case of a 
changing human capital specificity and the effect on firms' location over time, we try to   7
observe the different film related services with a different human capital specificity at one 
time. If local concentration differs accordingly, then either hypothesis 2a or 2b is supported, 
and we can infer what the likely consequences of a change of the independent variable over 
time would be. 
While local concentration can be measured by using an industry address book (Kay 
Publishing 2001), a proxy variable for human capital specificity had to be collected in a 
survey of these firms
4. In spring 2002, 2642 producers
5 of film-related services (frs) were 
contacted; 436 responded (response rate 16.5%). The responding firms belonged to 79 
different services, typically offering just one service, such as animal training, pyrotechnics, 
sound editing, dubbing, camera rental, film-specific legal services, miniature design, makeup, 
casting, carpentry, etc.
6 
For those 60 services which are offered by at least 10 firms, including those that did not 
answer, an adjusted Ellison-Glaeser (1997), or normalized Hirschman-Herfindahl index of 





















For each film-related service (frs) we know the number of relevant firms in each of 
Germany's 97 planning regions (Raumordnungsregionen)
7. An industry would be considered 
as lacking local concentration completely if in each planning region j, the region's share in the 
national number of employees in the respective frs, i.e. Nj,frs/Nfrs, equals its share of 
employees altogether, i.e. Nj/N. Then the term in brackets would be zero for every j, as would 
be the resulting measure of local sectoral concentration, hhifrs. Actually this almost happens 
for pharmacists, whom one would expect to be distributed over the country almost like the 
entire population: the resulting hhi is 0.001. 
                                                           
4 Coincidentally, the German Institute for Economic Research had done a lengthy survey of film producers just 
before I started working there, which is one reason why this study excluded the film producers in a narrow sense 
and focused on services needed for film production instead. 
5 Not counting 73 who were still in the database, but apparently non-existent at the time of the survey. 
6 Only 42 of the 436 responding firms (9.6%) belong to more than one category according to Kay Publishing 
(2001). 
7 Raumordnungsregionen are widely used for regional analysis in Germany; they comprise one or more NUTS 
III-regions that are linked by intensive commuting. Each of the four agglomerations which are most important 
for Germany's film industry (Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Munich), lies entirely within one planning region.   8
A more telling benchmark is mining, where a hhi of 0.097 results. Almost half of the services 
we investigate are more concentrated in space than mining, led by film lamps, 16mm camera 
rental and licensing agencies with an hhi of 0.343, 0.283 and 0.277, respectively.  
Whereas the service(s) offered and the location are known for all firms, additional 
information was obtained from the survey respondents. Here we describe only those data 
which are used in regressions reported in the next two sections: 
LONGADJUST is our proxy variable for measuring human capital specifity. It is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 if ten months or more are given as the typical period of 
vocational adjustment for new employees. (The question was: "For new employees, who are 
experienced in their occupation but new to your firm, typically a certain time span will pass 
until their productivity is comparable to that of their incumbent colleagues. Please try to 
estimate the number of month which is necessary for this."). 
FIRMSIZE, defined as the number of employees subject to social insurance contribution.  
OCCTRAINING: days of training per year and employee (on-the-job and off-the-job). 
TURNOVER: labour turnover, here defined as the sum over the number of employees taken 
on and employees laid off in the last two years, divided by the total number of current 
employees. 
FIXEDTERM: share of employees with fixed-term contracts. 
FILM: percentage of sales to film industry (median 80, mean 64 percent). 
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics.  
In section 3.4, TURNOVER, FILM, FIRMSIZE and LONGADJUST will be defined on the 
service level - e.g., the average size or average labour turnover rate of firms offering the 
respective service. This is necessary as the dependent variable, hhifrs, is also defined on the 
service level. In the next section, however, investigating one hypothesis, we can also make 
use of the data on the firm level.    9
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Firm-level data:  
variable         mean    median   min    max 
Labour turnover   0.86   0.67     0      5 
LongAdjust        0.51   1        0      1 
Firmsize         10.6    2        0      500 
FixedTerm         8.6    0        0      100 
OccTraining       3.2    3        0      10    
Agglomeration     0.62   1        0      1 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Service level data (60 obs.): 
hhifrs             0.12   0.0985   0.038  0.343 
Film              0.64   0.65     3.5    100 
LongAdjust        0.33   0        0      1 




3.3. Results on the firm level 
Hypothesis 1, set out in section 2, claimed that the turnover rate is higher in (sectoral) 
agglomerations - or, as Storper and Scott (1990, p.582) put it, "the speed of rotation of 
workers through the local job system is likely to correlate positively with the size of the local 
labour market." Having data on the former (i.e. labour turnover), and approximating the size 
of the local labour market with a dummy variable AGGLOMERATION, which is 1 for 
Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg and Munich, and 0 for other locations of the firm, we can test this 
hypothesis, see Table 2. 
   10
Table 2: Results on the firm level - Explaining the labour 
turnover rate 
 
Dependent variable: Labour turnover 
                    coefficient     t-statistic 
LongAdjust         -0.3171473       -2.54    
Firmsize           -0.0022376       -2.29    
FixedTerm           0.0067969        2.36    
OccTraining        -0.0987831       -2.04    
Agglomeration       0.0441796        0.37    
constant            1.159795         6.07    
---------------------------------------------------------- 
R² = 0.14  
148 observations  
(note: the number of observations is much lower than the number of responding 
firms, as labour turnover is not defined for firms with zero employees) 
 
All explanatory variables but one show the expected impact. A longer period of vocational 
adjustment leads to a lower turnover rate; turnover is lower in larger firms (who can move 
workers between projects within the firm instead of taking them on when needed and laying 
them off when a major project is finished), and a lower turnover rate is observed for firms 
with more occupational training. The AGGLOMERATION dummy variable, however, is 
insignificant
8 - in this sense there is no support for the conjecture that firms with a high labour 
turnover rate prefer to locate where large labour markets are.  
Though many coefficients are significant, considering the low R², the labour turnover rate is 
not very well explained by the data. One reason for this is the fact that certain benefits from 
turnover, which differ between the firms and the services, are not measurable for us. These 
benefits are due to the fact that in the cultural sector, "competition relies on the firms' 
                                                           
8 This is also the case if we replace AGGLOMERATION by another dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the 
firm, according to our survey, considers one of the four cities in question as its ideal location if it had to chose 
anew.   11
capability to innovate, which in turn depends on the adequacy of skills and projects" 
(Benhamou 2000, p.308) - hence on a certain amount of turnover, at least for some firms.  
Nevertheless, our results on the firm level can be seen as a first indication that something is 
working against the logic of the Marshallian labour pooling argument, which will be 
investigated more directly in the next section. 
 
3.4. Results on the service level 
What is the relationship between our proxy variable for human capital specificity, 
LONGADJUST, and local sectoral concentration? Regressing the former on the latter in the 
most simple manner, the following equation is obtained: 
 
HHI = 0.05582 + 0.00069 Film + 0.04459 LongAdjust 
 (2.45)    (2.02)       (2.73) 
R² = 0.21 
60 observations 
 
The coefficient of the variable FILM does not come as a surprise, as the one determinant of 
local concentration is the concentration of the demand side - in this case, these are the movie 
and television producers who need the various film-related services. However, not all services 
rely on film producers to an equal extent (e.g., you can book a stunt person or a 
pyrotechnician for your campus party), and those who have relatively more customers outside 
of the film business are less concentrated in space.  
The positive coefficient of LONGADJUST indicates that firms are more inclined to locate 
close to one another if firm specificity of the relevant human capital is high - i.e. when 
poaching is less likely.  
However, a major improvement of the above regression equation is possible. According to a 
conjecture by Combes and Duranton (2001, p.27), the incentives for poaching are higher in 
small product markets, i.e. markets with few competing firms. In this case the poaching firm 
would not only acquire additional human capital, it would also weaken a substantial part of its 
competitors (whereas this aspect would be negligible if the firm which loses an experienced   12
employee were just one of many). We try to capture this effect by constructing an interaction 
variable LONGADJUST*MSIZE. If its coefficient has a negative sign, then the impact of 
human capital specificity is larger, the smaller MSIZE, i.e., the number of firms is which offer 
the respective service. And this is indeed what we find, supporting the Combes and Duranton 
(2001) conjecture (see table 3 with standard error estimates being adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) procedure). 
 
Table 3: Explaining the regional concentration of film-related 
services 
Dependent variable: hhifrs 
                     coefficient     t-statistic   p 
Film                 0.005054         2.22         0.031 
LongAdjust           0.106825         3.67         0.001 
LongAdjust*MSize    -0.002562        -3.43         0.001 
MSize               -0.000143        -1.97         0.054 
constant             0.076287         5.38        <0.001 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
R² = 0.39 
60 observations  
t-statistics based on robust standard errors  
 
By definition the dependent variable, hhifrs, lies between 0 and 1; however. the actual values 
do not come close to these boundaries (see table 1), and inserting the observed values for 
FILM, LONGADJUST and MSIZE back into the regression equation from Table 3 does not 
result in predictions smaller than 0 or larger than 1.  
Compared to the previous regression, the one reported in table 3 leads to the same 
interpretation with respect to hypothesis 2b: film-related services with higher human capital 
specificity tend to be more concentrated in space. If employees cannot easily move from one 
firm to another, then firms can "afford", so to speak, to locate close to one another.   13
4. Conclusions 
It should be emphasized that our empirical results do not mean that the Marshallian labour 
pooling argument is wrong. Normatively, firms which are about to decide on their location 
should consider the advantage of a large local labour pool as well as the problem of poaching. 
The latter dominates, however, in the following sense: when human capital specificity is 
smaller, i.e. when both the pooling and the poaching issues are more relevant, then firms 
behave as if they were giving more weight to the latter.  
We know of no other empirical work which investigates this question. However, if future 
work (say, on different industries) supports our conclusions, and if those who expect firm 
specificity of human capital to decrease are right, then this is bad news for the sectoral 
clusters. 
   14
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